Brexit has the capacity to impact heavily on the agricultural sector across the United Kingdom in that it is a sector which has been both in receipt of substantial expenditure under the Common Agricultural Policy and subject to a pattern of close regulation at European Union level. This article will explore the legal implications for post-Brexit agricultural support, proceeding in three stages. First, there will be an outline of the current structure of the sector, with particular reference to its diversity in terms of physical landscape, operational scale and legal foundations. Secondly, there will be discussion of emerging policy within both central United Kingdom government and the devolved administrations. In this context, specific attention will directed to the likely extent of funding and the proposed drive towards higher standards in environmental protection and animal welfare. And, in each case, account will also be taken of specific implications which flow from overarching World Trade Organization rules. Thirdly, there will be consideration of the potentially difficult issues which arise as a result of agriculture being a devolved matter, different policy imperatives already becoming evident across the constituent parts of the United Kingdom. For the present, the prospect is that a bespoke support regime will survive Brexit and, in this sense, agricultural 'exceptionalism' will continue. However, the more precise form of such a regime remains as yet work in progress and its realisation will present considerable challenges not only in political terms, but also by reason of the complex legal geometry in which World Trade Organization rules and the constitutional rights of the devolved administrations are weighty factors.
INTRODUCTION
Brexit has the capacity to generate profound change for the agricultural sector across the United Kingdom (UK). Farmers will no longer be able to look to Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) support, with the extent and architecture of any future funding becoming a matter for domestic arrangements. Admittedly, CAP expenditure now accounts for a significantly lower proportion of the total European Union (EU) budget (39 per cent in 2015, as opposed to 73 per cent in 1985), 1 but there is evidence that it still makes a major contribution to the financial stability of many UK farms. For example, in 2015 total support provided over 30 per cent of agricultural factor income, 2 with the value of direct payments subsequently increased in 2016 by reason of post-referendum changes in the euro/sterling exchange rate. 3 At the same time, farmers will prima facie cease to be subject to a wider EU regulatory regime which impacts not only on primary production, but also across the whole agri-food chain. And the importance of this regulatory regime may be judged by the fact that many of those who have advocated leaving the EU have wanted 'lighter touch' governance for agriculture as an early dividend. Indeed, notwithstanding that the National * For their very helpful assistance in the writing of this article, grateful thanks are extended to: Professor Michael Dougan; Dr Ludivine Petetin; Professor Fiona Smith; and the Editor, who was also most generous in accommodating recent developments.
Farmers' Union (NFU) purposefully adopted an equivocal approach in the referendum debate, it regarded such EU legislation as a hindrance to competiveness. 4 This article will explore the legal implications for post-Brexit agricultural support, although attention will also be directed to the wider regulatory regime, since a defining feature of the CAP has been the increasing number of EU obligations relating to the environment, animal welfare and food quality which farmers must observe as a prerequisite to receipt of direct payments, with every indication that such a system of 'cross-compliance' is likely to continue post-Brexit. The exploration of these legal implications will proceed in three stages. First, there will be an outline of the current structure of the sector, with particular reference to its diversity in terms of physical landscape, operational scale and legal foundations. Secondly, there will be discussion of emerging policy within both central UK government and the devolved administrations. In this context, specific attention will be directed to the likely extent of funding and the proposed drive towards higher standards in environmental protection and animal welfare. And, in each case, this discussion will extend to the international trade dimension, since it would now seem to be accepted that post-Brexit the UK will be an individual member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and individually subject to its rules, which are likely to have profound implications in terms of not only tariffs on imports and exports, but also the degree to which the UK can support its farmers. Thirdly, there will be consideration of the potentially difficult issues which arise as a result of agriculture being a devolved matter. The administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have set out visions which differ materially from those emanating from 4 NFU, EU Referendum: UK Farming's Relationship with the EU (NFU, 2016), p 20 https://www.nfuonline.com/assets/61993. It may also be noted that the NFU Council in the event resolved 'that on the balance of existing evidence available to us at present, the interests of farmers are best served by our continuing membership of the European Union': NFU, 'NFU Council Agrees Resolution on the EU Referendum' (18 May 2016) https://www.nfuonline.com/news/eu-referendum/eu-referendum-news/nfu-council-agreesresolution-on-the-eu-referendum/.
Whitehall, a state of affairs which is consistent with not only the level of diversity already indicated, but also earlier policies (such as on the cultivation of genetically modified crops).
Yet, questions may be raised as to the extent to which a truly devolved agricultural policy can be implemented when, under the constitutional settlements, key powers in relation to, inter alia, finance and intentional trade currently remain vested in central UK government.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF UK AGRICULTURE
On a narrow interpretation, the agricultural sector in the UK may be regarded as a relatively small component within the national economy. Its share of Gross Value Added (GVA) in 2016 was less than 1 per cent, while the total labour force on commercial holdings was only 466,000. 5 On a broader interpretation, however, the agri-food sector in 2015 accounted for a total estimated Gross Value Added of £109 billion, some 6.6 per cent of national GVA. 6 Further, it is an area of vigorous international trade: in 2016 exports of food and drink for the first time exceeded £20 billion, 7 with particular momentum in quality produce, although it may also be noted that it is an area of systemic deficit and that the trade gap in food, feed and drink during the same year widened to £22.5 billion. 8 in the uplands, but also enjoying currency in the lowlands. 13 Secondly, while the scale of holdings in the UK is large by EU standards, the overall figures again mask regional variations. As of June 2016, the average area of all holdings was 80 hectares, but the average for Scotland was 109 hectares as compared to only 41 hectares Thirdly, a fundamental consideration remains that agriculture is a sector where the legal foundations differ substantially by reason of powers having been devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales; 16 and, in this context, the broad extent of the devolved powers has received express affirmation from both the UK Supreme Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the National Assembly of Wales was competent to introduce a regime for the regulation of agricultural wages in Wales, notwithstanding argument by the Attorney General that in reality the legislation did not relate to agriculture, but to employment and industrial relations (matters which had not been devolved). 17 In addition, the outlines of future agricultural support regimes could be detected.
Consistent with earlier policy documents, 25 however, there was less than enthusiasm for the continuation of direct payments to farmers on an area basis, with instead a growing expectation that farmers would be required to earn receipt of their support, looking to alternative models such as the provision of 'public goods' or 'ecosystem services'. 26 Even before the referendum the Minister for Agriculture, George Eustice, stated that:
[t]he UK has always made clear that we would like to move away from subsidies in the long run. However, we recognise that there is scope for using taxpayers' money to pay farmers for public goods that the market otherwise would not reward, such as protecting the natural environment, supporting biodiversity and improving animal welfare. 27 And such sentiments have been echoed thereafter. At the Oxford Farming Conference on 4 January 2017, the same Minister for Agriculture affirmed that funding would remain in place, but in exchange for the provision of ecosystem services (together with support for ins urance and productivity); 28 28 'Farm Subsidy System to be Overhauled Post-Brexit, Says Eustice' https://www.ofc.org.uk/insights/farm-subsidy-system-to-be-overhauled-post-brexit-sayseustice.
environment' was 'a legitimate aim of public policy'. 29 Similarly, the Government response to the Report of that Committee reiterated that '[a] new agri-environment system which encompasses a broad range of the public goods delivered by our farmers, such as our treasured countryside and landscape is a priority '. 30 More recently, policy objectives would seem to be coalescing around the receipt by farmers of support for the promotion of high levels of environmental protection and at least one further 'public good', namely animal welfare. 31 In particular, the new Secretary of State for Environment, Michael Gove, announced that, 'alongside encouraging greater biodiversity and the way in which farmers manage their land, I also want to see higher standards across the board of animal welfare', with both these being seen as integral to the generation of a 'Green Brexit'. 32 Indeed, this 'race to the top' is arguably developing as a defining feature of future UK agricultural policy, although there would also appear to be certain headwinds which such an approach will face. In particular, concerns have been forcefully expressed that it would be difficult to maintain high environmental and animal welfare standards in the event of an influx of cheaper imports produced to lower specifications. 33 And these concerns were heightened following a less than equivocal rejection of the prospect of imports of chlorine-washed chicken by the Secretary of State for International Trade, Liam 29 See House of Lords European Union Committee note 9 above, para 223. 30 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-energy-environmentsubcommittee/Brexit-agriculture/Gov-response-Brexit-Ag.pdf. 31 Although the scope of 'public goods' delivered by agriculture may remain contested, there is evident consensus that both high environmental and animal welfare standards so qualify: for a comprehensive discussion of this aspect, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical Framework (OECD, 2001). 32 Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, The Unfrozen Moment -Delivering a Green Brexit (21 July 2017) https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-unfrozen-moment-delivering-a-greenbrexit. 33 See, eg, House of Lords European Union Committee note 9 above, paras 125-153. stopping short of a more purely 'public goods' model as championed by their adviser, Professor Dieter Helm. More precisely, he has advocated that the use of public funds on the purchase of 'public goods', directly contracted through public bodies, is to be preferred to the maintenance of existing levels of subvention (even if focus is shifted from the decoupled income support to the environment); and, while he has been clear that farmers may be well placed to secure these direct contracts, he has also countenanced that others may participate in this 'market'. 35 Such a regime would, however, give rise to novel challenges not only in terms of the identification of the 'public good', but also in terms of policy implementation and evaluation. 36 At the same time, as a perhaps inevitable consequence of the constitutional settlement, Significantly, the Basic Payment Scheme, paid on an area basis and understood to be decoupled from production, accounted for as much as £2,568 million in 2016. 39 And it may be re-iterated that, with particular relevance to rural development measures, there were material differences between the constituent parts of the UK, with the focus of expenditure in 37 'Farm Subsidy System to be Overhauled Post-Brexit, Says Eustice' https://www.ofc.org.uk/insights/farm-subsidy-system-to-be-overhauled-post-brexit-sayseustice. 38 The Treasury will therefore reassure the agricultural sector that it will receive the same level of funding that it would have received under Pillar 1 of CAP until end of the Multiannual Financial Framework in 2020, alongside considering the options for long-term reform beyond that point. The government will work closely with stakeholders to ensure that funding in the period immediately after exit is used to he lp the agricultural sector transition effectively to a new domestic policy framework. These funds will be allocated using the principles of CAP Pillar 1, and we will of 40 course consider the opportunities post exit for making any short-term improvements to the way the system operates once we cease to be bound by EU rules. 42 Subsequently, reassurances have become even more expansive, at least as to future horizon for the maintenance of a support regime and its scale. Most notably, there was a commitment in the Conservative Party Election Manifesto that 'we will continue to commit the same cash total in funds for farm support until the end of the parliament'; 43 and this was re-affirmed in the Agreement between the Conservative and Unionist Party and the De mocratic Unionist Party (DUP) following the June 2017 General Election, with express recognition of 'the importance of the agriculture sector to Northern Ireland and the oppor tunities for growth that exist': indeed, the Agreement went so far as to identify agriculture as 'a critical policy area during the EU exit negotiations'. 44 Accordingly, it could perhaps be argued that a side-wind of the 2017 General Election, and the consequent reliance of the Government on the DUP, has been significantly to prioritise agriculture within the post-Brexit landscape. On the other hand, a structural change in terms of agricultural expenditure will be that, subject to the reassurances mentioned above, budgetary decisions will as a rule be made on an annual basis, farmers no longer being able to rely on the extended EU programming period (with the present period running from 2014 to 2020). And it may further be observed that neither the Conservative Party Election Manifesto nor the Agreement between the Conservatives and the DUP made mention of continued allocation 'using the principles of CAP Pillar 1'. 42 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/545767/CST_l etter_to_SoS_for_DExEU_August_2016.PDF. 43 Forward Together: Our Plan for a Stronger Britain and a Prosperous Future -The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2017, p 26 https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto. 44 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conservative-and-dup-agreement-and-ukgovernment-financial-support-for-northern-ireland/agreement-between-the-conservative-andunionist-party-and-the-democratic-unionist-party-on-support-for-the-government-inparliament.
Over and above any such political decisions within the UK, consideration must also be given to the WTO legislative framework which has the capacity to restrain overall levels of funding to farmers. More specifically, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) continues to impose ceilings on the provision of 'domestic support', with each WTO member obliged to maintain trade-distorting (Amber Box) domestic support within the Total Aggregate Measurement of Support as determined by reference to their respective schedules; 45 and, in this context, three aspects may be highlighted. First, the relevant schedule is currently in the name of the EU, without any distinct share in the name of the UK.
Secondly, there would not seem to be clear rules as to how the UK, as an individual member of the WTO post-Brexit, might establish its own schedule. 46 Since UK domestic support at the time of the URAA contributed to the permitted overall 'Base Total Aggregate Measurement of Support' for the EU, there is an argument that the UK should be entitled to the 'return' of that contribution. 47 On the other hand, practical difficulties have been identified as to how the precise calculation should be made, including problems in obtaining historic data. 48 Such historic hurdles would be circumvented if the UK entitlement were instead determined, as suggested by Bartels, by reference to UK receipts from the CAP, 'calculated as a ratio of UK:EU CAP payments (over a representative period of three years) 45 For an explanation of schedules and on the URAA, generally, see, eg, JA McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture: a Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2006). 46 For cogent discussion of this issue, see, eg, L Bartels, 'The UK's status in the WTO after Brexit' (23 September 2016) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2841747; L Brink, 'UK Brexit and WTO farm support limits' (13 July 2016) http://capreform.eu/ukbrexit-and-wto-farm-support-limits/); A Matthews, 'Establishing the UK's non-exempt limit on agricultural support after Brexit' (29 January 2017) http://capreform.eu/establishing-theuks-non-exempt-limit-on-agricultural-support-after-brexit/; and House of Lords European Union Committee note 9 above, paras 58-69. 47 The position would seem less complex if the UK had become a Member State of the EU after the conclusion of the URAA: in which regard, see, eg, the specific increase in Total Aggregate Measurement of Support notified by the EU consequent upon the accession of Bulgaria: WTO, G/AG/N/EU/26 (2 November 2015) Notification of Domestic Support by the European Union for the 2012/2013 Marketing Year). 48 See Brink note 46 above. applied to the EU's total subsidy commitments'. 49 A consequence, however, would seem to be an entitlement adversely affected by low levels of expenditure on rural development measures over the representative period, but calculation on the basis of current figures has also been foreseen by the Minister for Agriculture, who regarded the logical approach to be a UK entitlement 'based on our allocation of the CAP budget'. 50 Besides, he also foresaw this to be no more than the exercise of 'a process of technical rectification' for WTO purposes, 51 notwithstanding the possibility that certification of the new schedules of the UK (and the EU) might yet be required from other WTO members, and that such certification might not be forthcoming. 52 Thirdly, if the UK were to fail to secure a schedule or were to become entitled to a schedule which permitted only low levels of domestic support, the effects would be mitigated to the extent that subsidies to farmers were delivered through measures which were exempt under the URAA. In this regard, specific attention may be paid to: de minimis support; Blue Box support; and Green Box support. It is provided that the first-mentioned falls outside the calculation by a WTO member of its current levels of domestic support, but the de minimis thresholds are not set high for developed country members, such as the UK: in their case, any product-specific domestic support must not exceed 5 per cent of the total value of production of a basic agricultural product during the relevant year; and any non-product-specific 49 See Bartels note 46 above, pp 11-12. In consequence, the greatest opportunity to secure WTO compatibility for UK domestic support post-Brexit is likely to be Green Box exemption under Annex 2 to the URAA. All Green Box measures must meet the 'fundamental requirement' of having 'no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production'; and, accordingly, all such measures must meet two 'basic criteria', together with policy-specific criteria and conditions, the 'basic criteria' being as follows:
53 URAA, Article 6.4(a). In the case of developing country members, the threshold is 10 per cent; and, in the case of least-developed country members, there is no requirement to undertake domestic support reduction commitments. 54 See A Matthews, 'Establishing the UK's Non-exempt Limit on Agricultural Support After Brexit' (29 January 2017) http://capreform.eu/establishing-the-uks-non-exempt-limit-onagricultural-support-after-brexit/, last accessed on. 55 instead had to different Green Box policy-specific criteria and conditions; and compatibility with these different policy-specific criteria and conditions will be addressed below. 62 
C. Environmental Protection and Animal Welfare
As has been seen, current central UK government preference in terms of agricultural support post-Brexit would appear increasingly directed towards the promotion of high levels of environmental protection and high standards of animal welfare. In this respect, it may be considered to continue longstanding traditions: as highlighted in the House of Commons Research Paper, Leaving the EU, the UK enjoys 'a heritage' in habitats protection, 63 while a leading role in policy development is perhaps even more pronounced in the area of animal welfare. For example, the UK banned the use of closely-confined sow stalls in the pig sector as from 1 January 1999, whereas it was not until 1 January 2013 that such a ban was imposed by EU legislation, and then only partially. 64 Further, the UK has been the source of (in the event, unsuccessful) attempts before the CJEU to bolster standards of animal welfare on export; 65 and a notable feature of the Conservative Party Election Manifesto was that it 62 See Section III, C below. 63 regarded as a post-Brexit dividend the ability to 'take early steps to control the export of live farm animals for slaughter '. 66 That having been said, it must also be recognised that the use of agricultural support mechanisms to promote both environmental and animal welfare standards has already become embedded in the EU regulatory framework for the CAP. In the case of Pillar I, as indicated, the cross-compliance regime now extends to cover a range of statutory management requirements under, inter alia, the Nitrates Directive, the Wild Birds Directive, the Habitats Directive and the EU legislation providing minimum standards for the protection of calves and of pigs, while farmers must also observe a range of standards for good agricultural and environmental condition established at national level relating to, inter alia, environment, climate change and animal welfare. 67 is that the detailed provisions in respect of crop diversification rules were singled out as an early target for repeal post-Brexit. 70 Further, specific support for the environment has long been available under the Pillar II. Thus, the current regime includes within its six priorities for rural development the promotion of animal welfare and 'restoring, preserving and enhancing ecosystems related to agriculture and forestry', 71 with three specific measures which fall within the latter category being: agri-environment-climate schemes; organic farming schemes; and Natura 2000 and Water Framework Directive payments. 72 Importantly, all these three measures are understood to go above and beyond the baseline of good agricultural practice which is inherent in cross-compliance obligations, with express provision also to prevent farmers receiving funding for the same actions under both the Greening Payment and rural development regime. 73 On the other hand, it may be noted that the 2013 CAP reforms did not see any substantial advances in terms of elevating animal welfare standards. 74 Accordingly, the current CAP legislative framework delivering support to farmers does contain a considerable range of measures addressing concerns in relation to both environmental protection and animal welfare. Yet there remains a real sense that scheme design could be materially improved post-Brexit and that, in particular, the detailed rules of agri-environmental regimes could be tailored more effectively to conditions pertaining within the UK, while there is also a strong perception that the UK enjoys 'thought leadership' in this area. 75 Indeed, before the House of Lords European Union Energy and Environment SubCommittee, Professor Ian Hodge declared that 'we do not really need an agricultural policy;
we need an ecosystem services policy', adding that '[w]e need to set out thinking that our aim should be to deliver the maximum social value from rural land rather than to recreate an agricultural policy'. 76 In addition, studies into the current CAP regime have revealed scope for more responsive measures. For example, Hart et al have identified as one possibility the re-design of the CAP 'as a single integrated set of measures structured in a tiered hierarchy', since this 'would provide considerable opportunities to look at agricultural land in a more integrated way than has been the case to date and pursue more sustainable management in a synergistic and streamlined way, whilst giving due weight to targeted approaches'. 77 Moreover, such an initiative would offer the opportunity to build upon experience with 'hierarchy' regimes already gained in England under the earlier Environmental Stewardship Scheme (with its entry level and higher level) and the current Countryside Stewardship Scheme (with its mid-tier and higher tier). On the other hand, the more targeted the approach, the greater is likely to be the administrative burden, which may not sit easily with perceptions that Brexit will generate a lighter-touch regulatory environment.
What would seem clear, in any event, is that post-Brexit the UK will not be obliged to observe EU rules which dictate the proportion of expenditure on, respectively, direct payments under Pillar I and rural development under Pillar II. This will allow funding to flow towards more specific environmental protection and animal welfare measures, effectively privileging what are currently 'Pillar II-type' measures, but at the expense of preexisting entitlement to the area-based Basic Farm Payment and Greening Payment. An important question, therefore, will be whether the more targeted measures will be available to all farmers, who might otherwise face the loss of Pillar I direct payments without compensatory access to alternative support. And, in this context, it is also interesting to note that such redirection of funding could in fact be regarded as an extension of developing EU policy, in that for some time Member States and their regions have been able to transfer a proportion of funds from Pillar I to Pillar II. 78 Further, when implementing the 2013 CAP reforms, the constituent parts of the UK took divergent approaches. Although all opted for transfers from Pillar I to Pillar II, they have done so in different proportions (the maximum proportion permitted being 15 per cent). In England, the initial decision was to make a 12 per cent transfer, with this percentage being in large part determined by the demand for funds for agri-environmental schemes. 79 In Wales, the preferred option was an immediate transfer of the maximum 15 per cent, on the basis that the rural development regime in Wales provides 'essential business support for farming through advice, training and through agri-environment schemes' and that '[ı]t supports rural businesses and communities and it is to be developed as a tool for farming and the wider rural economy'. 80 By contrast, in Scotland, the transfer was limited to 9.5 per cent, a rate considered to strike 'the right balance of support for our farmers and rural development ', 81 while in Northern Ireland there was no transfer at all, albeit by reason of a procedural error. 82 Accordingly, there is again evidence that funding levels are liable to be driven by a range of regional priorities, with the emphasis on agri-environmental schemes being the greatest in England; and this would also suggest that a 'one size fits all' approach to the implementation of an ecosystems services model may not prove particularly attractive to the devolved administrations, as will be explored further below.
In addition to overall levels of domestic support, WTO rules may also constrain the ability to use subventions specifically to promote higher standards of environmental protection and animal welfare. Under paragraph 12 of Annex 2 to the URAA, exemption is conferred on 'payments under environmental programmes', but the detailed rules would seem to limit these to more targeted measures (as opposed to those which are 'broad but shallow'), since eligibility is dependent upon participation in 'a clearly-defined government environmental or conservation programme'. Besides, the extent to which such payments can operate to transfer resources to farmers may be affected by the requirement that '[t]he amount of payment shall be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in complying with the government programme'. 83 In consequence, there is arguably little scope to provide an incentive element; and it is of note that the EU legislation no longer provides such an element in the case of agri-environment-climate payments, notwithstanding that this had once been available in the case of agri-environment payments. 84 Further, Annex 2 does not as yet contain a bespoke exemption for animal welfare payments, notwithstanding efforts on the part of the EU for its inclusion. 85 And these potential difficulties ha ve been expressly recognised by the Minister for Agriculture, in the following terms:
Ironically, the single farm payment [now Basic Payment], which is ultimately an area-based, distorting subsidy, technically at the moment qualifies as Green Box, whereas the types of policies that would be more modern, more progressive -payments to get animal welfare outcomes, risk management measures, those types of things -we understand, at the moment, would probably be deemed under the WTO rules as amber box '. 86 More generally, the provision of support to promote high standards of environmental protection and animal welfare would be all the more vital if the UK were to permit the importation of agri-food products which had been produced to lower standards than those applicable domestically. And definitely there has been a body of opinion to the effect that Brexit offers the opportunity to reduce costs to consumers by lowering or even removing not only tariffs, but also non-tariff barriers of this kind. 87 However, such an approach has met with opposition from both non-governmental organisations and the industry: for example, in its 2017 Manifesto, the NFU affirmed to the contrary that 'UK farmers want new markets that exploit their proud record of welfare and environmental production standards', but with an expectation that the central UK Government would recognise 'these same standards when negotiating new agreements with countries outside the EU'. 88 More recently, such arguments have revolved around concerns that a free trade agreement with the United States could see the importation of chlorine-washed chicken and hormone-injected beef; 89 and there is every indication that agri-food production standards will prove to be a contested area both during the Brexit negotiations and long thereafter: indeed, the House of Lords European Union Committee concluded in its Report on Brexit: farm animal welfare:
Our evidence strongly suggests that the greatest threat to farm animal welfare standards post-Brexit would come from UK farmers competing against cheap, imported food from countries that produce to lower standards than the UK. Unless consumers are willing to pay for higher welfare products, UK farmers could become uncompetitive and welfare standards in the UK could come under pressure. 90 In this context too, world trade considerations enjoy salience in that there has long been debate whether members are entitled under WTO rules to shelter their own farmers by insisting that imports meet domestic environmental and animal welfare standards. 91 Further, the debate has been the more intense where the importing member seeks to introduce measures which distinguish between products based upon process and production methods which leave no trace in the end-product itself ('non-product-related process and production methods' or 'NPR-PPMs'). 92 To provide a pertinent illustration of a measure within this category, a member might seek to distinguish between meat from livestock raised extensively on grass in the uplands and meat from livestock raised in feed lots, in which case it would be no easy matter to find physical differences in the end product, notwithstanding that the manner of rearing would have the capacity materially to influence consumer preferences. 93 Such issues resonate strongly across the WTO legal order. To consider just the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 94 Article III provides that a member shall not discriminate between its own products and 'like' imported products; 95 and the WTO Secretariat has itself acknowledged that a determination of likeness for this purpose may be 'particularly challenging' in the case of NPR-PPMs, offering as an example circumstances where governments seek to discriminate between wood products derived from sustainably grown forest and wood whose production method is unknown. 96 At the same time, higher 92 93 On the other hand, it is not impossible to envisage circumstances where the manner of rearing of livestock in feed lots could generate traces in the end-product (for example, there is likely to be greater use of antibiotics when animals are reared intensively and thereby greater likelihood of antibiotic residues in the meat sold to consumers). 94 See also, in particular: Article 3.3 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which provides that, subject to detailed rules, 'Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations'; and Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which provides that, again subject to detailed rules, the protection of animal life and health and the environment are 'legitimate objectives' in the case of technical regulations. 95 'The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use': Article III. And the jurisprudence of the Dispute Settlement Body in respect of this Article illuminates not only the extent to which it offers members latitude in principle to condition imports, but also the extent to which this latitude is closely circumscribed. Thus, in US -Shrimp/Turtle, the Appellate Body found that measures to restrict the import of shrimp and shrimp products with a view to reducing the incidental take of sea turtles could, pr ima facie, be justified under Article XX(g); 97 and, in EC -Seal Products, it found that an EU prohibition of the importation and sale of processed and unprocessed seal products could, pr ima facie, be justified under Article XX(a). 98 However, in both cases, it also found that the measures concerned failed to satisfy the chapeau to Article XX which requires that they should not be 'applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade'. 99 In consequence, there would seem to be good grounds for believing that the UK could, in principle, impose general conditions on imports in respect of environmental and animal welfare standards without breaching WTO rules. But domestic standards would need to be at least as high and there would also need to be a very carefully crafted regime so as to avoid any form of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. At the same time, there would seem to be scope to include such high standards as part of a negotiated free trade agreement; 100 yet, as already observed, there are indications to the effect that political pressures, at least for the present, may tend otherwise.
D. Devolution
There is without doubt general consensus that devolution will impact significantly on the development of post-Brexit agricultural policies. 101 To provide just one illustration, it will be were replaced by the UK Treasury according to a population based Barnett calculation, then compared to the current mechanism for dividing up EU funds among the home nations, it is likely that Wales would be looking at an allocation reduction of 40%'. 106 Further, as highlighted by Dr Alan Greer, the mechanisms by which funding will be dispensed have the capacity to affect the degree of policy latitude enjoyed by the devolved administrations:
What will also be crucial is the relationship between funding and flexibility, which is likely to be uneasy. In the past (for example in relation to devolution in Northern Ireland between 1921-1972), a limiting factor on differentiation was that if 'natio nal' funding was provided through the UK Treasury, then it wanted relatively uniform policy and regulatory measures in return, limiting the scope for differentiation. 107 For the present, emerging agricultural support policies already reveal a substantial degree of differentiation, even if details remain to be finalised. Thus, as noted, DEFRA has shown a preference for promoting higher standards of environmental protection and animal welfare and it would be a reasonable assumption that this would be the direction of travel for England, not least because agri-environment-climate schemes are already the focus of the Rural Development Programme for England 2014-2020. Nevertheless, as also noted, there has been demonstrable reaction against a 'one size fits all' approach, with differing priorities becoming evident across the devolved administrations. In Wales, the social and cultural dimensions of agriculture have received express recognition, with emphasis also placed on 106 See House of Lords European Union Committee note 9 above, para 244; and, in respect of Wales, see also, eg, J Woolford and J Hunt, The UK in a Changing Europe: Wales and the EU -Agriculture and Food (Cardiff University, 2016).
Ireland concerns have been expressed as to the extent that a regime tailored to local conditions may be possible in light of financial constraints imposed at UK level. 115 Some comfort that regional differentiation can be accommodated post-Brexit may be found in the substantial variation in focus which is evident in the current Rural Development Programmes applicable across the UK. For example, during 2016, agri-environment-climate measures attracted the lion's share of funding in England, whereas support for less-favoured areas was the main destination of expenditure in Scotland, a state of affairs replicated also in Northern Ireland. 116 And, significantly, less-favoured area support has by tradition been regarded as enjoying a social as well as an environmental dimension, being directed, inter alia, to maintaining the viability of holdings which face natural challenges and, thereby, the prevention of land abandonment. 117 On the other hand, even if the devolved administrations continue to be entitled to a For the present, only the outlines of agricultural support policies across the UK have become evident and this ongoing uncertainty has given rise to concerns in the farming community. 121 Nevertheless, what would seem clear is that there is general acceptance at the level of both central UK government and the devolved administrations that a bespoke support regime will survive Brexit and, in this sense, agricultural 'exceptionalism' will continue. Further, there has now been reassurance both in the Conservative Party Election Manifesto and the Agreement between the Conservatives and the DUP that the current level of subsidy will be maintained until the end of the current Parliament in 2022 (as opposed to the earlier reassurance that it would be maintained until 2020). In this respect, there are good grounds for believing that farmers have been beneficiaries of the June 2017 General Election.
On the other hand, the precise contours of post-Brexit agricultural support remain to be defined. What would seem tolerably clear is that there is no strong commitment to a regime based upon Pillar I principles; and, in particular, the Basic Payment Scheme may be facing a relatively short shelf-life. At the same time, there would appear to be a degree of consensus around promoting high standards of environmental and animal welfare, but different priorities continue to pertain across the constituent parts of the United Kingdom and even central UK government has shown a more varied appetite, with interest also in measures to promote risk management and technical innovation. 122 Further, in light of more radical options currently circulating, such as the use of public funds on the purchase of 'public goods', farmers may yet be encountering a quite different regulatory landscape within a relatively short horizon, at least by the standards of an industry accustomed to a pace of change largely dictated by the elapse of EU programming periods.
In any event, over and above political considerations, decision-making as to future agricultural support regimes will need to take into account a complex range of factors which enjoy legal basis. In this context, WTO rules and the constitutional rights of the devolved administrations are very much to the fore. Thus, as has been seen, WTO rules have the capacity not only to impose overall limits on the amount of domestic support to farmers, but also to shape the design of individual measures. And, if preference is for support to promote higher standards of environmental protection and animal welfare, then specific difficulties may be encountered. For example, it is uncertain whether under current WTO rules there is scope to secure exemption for an incentive element to environmental payments, while there is as yet no express category of exempt support for animal welfare measures. Any such limitations on domestic support would prove the more profound if future free trade agreements were to permit imports produced to lower environmental and animal welfare standards. Further, if the UK were to seek to condition imports on the observance of high standards as applied domestically, the position is not free from doubt as to the legitimacy of measures of this kind in WTO law; and, even if they are legitimate, they would need to be closely crafted so as to exclude, inter alia, any discriminatory treatment.
As has also been seen, the devolved administrations are already entitled to a degree of policy latitude in agricultural matters, which has found expression in, for example, In light of their complex legal geometry and the strong emotions which they generate, there is every reason to believe that agriculture generally and agricultural support more specifically will continue to attract a high profile during the Brexit negotiations and long thereafter. Just as the sector has commanded the greatest proportion of the EU budget and proved a stumbling block in numerous WTO negotiations, its 'exceptional' status is likely to continue. 124 Definitely, in the case of vast majority of the institutional actors, the present debate is not so much whether support should be provided for farmers, but how it should be provided. Yet the combination of the competing interests of those institutional actors, WTO rules and the constitutional settlement within the UK make the second question a rather difficult one to answer. 
